## 1AC Work

### 1AC Equality Advantage

Advantage One is Equality

#### Wind production discourse elevates technical expertise above other forms of knowledge. This is not a neutral epistemology: Unquestioned expertise casts other forms of knowing as Other, silencing unheard voices in policy discussion.

Aitken 9 (Mhairi, Research Fellow at U. Edinburgh and PhD from Robert Gordon University. “Wind Power Planning Controversies and the Construction of Expert and Lay Knowledges” *Science as Culture* 18:1, March 2009 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09505430802385682>) will

Wynne (1996) has criticised a large section of the STS literature in saying that whilst it¶ views the public as being sceptical and reflexive with regards to science and technology it¶ does not attribute meaningful agency to the public. He contends that whilst much has been¶ written to illustrate the contested nature of science and technology and the loss of public¶ trust therein, the dichotomous categories of expert and lay knowledge have been maintained.¶ Thus there is little or no consideration of the potential roles of lay people to¶ shape and create knowledges or of their ability to develop their own meaningful knowledges¶ independent of expertise. Furthermore, by maintaining this dichotomous boundary¶ it is expected that lay people will only contest science when controversial issues are¶ brought to their attention from within the discipline—i.e. by experts. This denies lay¶ people the ability to make their own judgements about the merits of science.¶ Such themes are highly salient to the issues discussed within this paper. The case study¶ discussed here will show how lay knowledge was sidelined through the planning processes¶ which determined the outcome of a wind farm planning application. As such it is centrally¶ concerned with the roles of expert and lay knowledge within the planning system—¶ especially at a public inquiry where the final verdict was reached. Several previous case¶ studies of lay and expert knowledge within the planning system, and public inquiries in¶ particular, have considered similar issues. Two particular case studies will be referred¶ to here. The first is a public inquiry to determine a planning application for a thermal¶ oxide reprocessing plant (THORP) at Windscale (which was later renamed as Sellafield)¶ in the Cumbria region of north-west England in 1977 (Wynne, 1982); the second is the¶ proposed exploitation of a bog in Northern Ireland in the mid-1980s (Yearley, 1989,¶ 2004).¶ Both of these case studies illustrated the central role played by expertise within¶ the public inquiry process. Moreover, both showed that this role was based on a false¶ notion of the nature of science and scientific practices. According to Wynne (1982), the¶ Windscale Inquiry adopted a strongly positivist view of science in which science was¶ seen as a consensual activity which enabled the objective discovery of ‘facts’. Through¶ this lens disagreement was seen as evidence of ‘bad’ science or incompetence. Similarly,¶ Yearley (1989, 2004) contended that at the Northern Irish bog inquiry an ‘inflated image of¶ scientific objectivity’ was apparent and led to the effective discrediting of opposition¶ witnesses.¶ These two case studies highlight the nature of the inquiry system as demanding that all¶ evidence be backed up by scientific ‘proof’ and be based on a sound objective approach.¶ Witnesses were required to present their evidence in the language of facts and this presented¶ a major challenge for lay people objecting to the proposed development out of¶ anxieties relating to potential impacts on their home or lifestyle. Furthermore, by creating¶ such an important role for expertise it was possible for witnesses to be discredited through¶ arguments that they were not experts. As Yearley (1989, 2004) noted it is not necessary to¶ prove that any experts actually exist in a particular subject, but by proving that a particular¶ witness is not an expert in the precise subject being discussed they can be discredited and¶ their evidence thrown out. This encourages lawyers conducting cross-examination to focus¶ more on the credentials of witnesses than on the substance of the evidence they present. In¶ particular it was shown to mean that where two witnesses present evidence on the same¶ topic for opposing parties the lawyers would focus on attempting to prove that their¶ counterpart’s witness was unreliable, inappropriately qualified or incompetent and¶ hence that their evidence should not be taken into consideration. In the case of planning¶ applications, this typically works to the advantage of developers since, as has been¶ noted by Wynne (1982), opposition groups typically do not have the same level of¶ resources as developers and hence are represented by some experts but mostly lay¶ people from the local community. Inevitably this lay representation will not have the¶ same level of qualifications or experience as the developers’ experts.¶ However, the notion that disagreement represents one or both parties being inexperienced¶ or incompetent is based on a positivist view of science and knowledge and an¶ ‘inflated image of scientific objectivity’ (Yearley, 1989, 2004). There is a great deal of literature¶ in the field of STS which suggests that such a view of science is erroneous. Notably¶ it has been acknowledged that science typically leads to disagreement and a lack of consensus.¶ As such the conflicting evidence found within inquiries does not necessarily represent¶ bad practices but may instead demonstrate opportunities for debate. However, such¶ debate would not be helpful for reaching conclusive or efficient decisions and therefore¶ boundaries of acceptable language and approach are set in order to construct ‘appropriate’¶ knowledges for decision-making and how this ought to be communicated.¶ Wynne (1982) contends that whilst scientists are accustomed to debating their findings¶ and accept disagreement and challenge as a (constructive) part of their work, the inquiry¶ setting, with its emphasis on uncovering ‘the truth’ and dispelling disagreement within a¶ designated time frame, is an alien and potentially intimidating forum which does not easily¶ accommodate full discussion or analysis of their work. He contends that;¶ Scientists (especially those who have suffered from its ruthless tactics) . . . usually¶ believe that what distinguishes technical discussion at inquiries from academic discussion¶ is the lack of any impetus towards the truth (Wynne, 1982, p. 135).¶ Additionally, Wynne (1982) highlighted the need for inquiries to maintain an illusion of¶ objectivity in order to secure legitimacy. However, he also noted how this illusion disguises¶ a great many subjective judgements without which a decisive outcome would¶ not be possible. As will be highlighted below, Scottish planning policies (and those relating¶ to renewable energy in particular) begin from the presumption that development is¶ necessary and desirable. Moreover, the Scottish Executive is seen to have taken a prorenewables¶ approach and thus questions must be raised about the potentially partisan position¶ of inquiry decision-makers who are appointed by Scottish Executive ministers. As¶ Wynne (1982) notes, important considerations are raised as to the role of the state as an¶ ‘impartial arbiter’ in areas of conflict where they have a clear vested interest.¶ Wynne (1982) suggests that public inquiries represent exercises in social control; this is¶ an interesting concept and raises questions as to the implicit role of planning appeals in¶ wind power controversies. Wynne (1982) argued that experiences at the Windscale¶ Inquiry sent out messages to wider society about the appropriate language and knowledge¶ to be used in decision-making arenas. Thus, the inquiry was portrayed as a means of constructing¶ knowledge as expert or lay, and signalling the relevant insignificance of the¶ latter. This implicit role will be highlighted within the case study discussed in this¶ paper, where it will be suggested that the public inquiry process served to construct expertise¶ as authoritative and subsequently diminished the influence of lay knowledge.¶ In order to understand the context out of which this case study has emerged it is worth¶ briefly outlining the current literature which exists around the topic of onshore wind power¶ and public responses to it.

#### Expertism is decidedly antidemocratic, favoring academic knowledge over dissenting voices. This pushes aside egalitarianism in favor of scientific hegemony.

Aitken 9 (Mhairi, Research Fellow at U. Edinburgh and PhD from Robert Gordon University. “Wind Power Planning Controversies and the Construction of Expert and Lay Knowledges” *Science as Culture* 18:1, March 2009 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09505430802385682>) will

As will be highlighted below, objections from members of the public are depicted as¶ posing a significant problem for renewable energy development—particularly in the¶ case of wind power (Bell et al., 2005; Devine-Wright, 2007; Peel & Lloyd, 2007).¶ However, this paper argues that such depictions limit our understanding of people’s¶ experiences with wind power projects. This also serves to disguise how knowledge is constructed¶ in planning policies and procedures. As a remedy, this paper analyses the scope¶ for non-experts to influence decision-making. Thus, the central questions which this paper¶ aims to address are; how influential are local objectors? What role do they play within¶ planning application decisions relating to renewable energy developments (particularly¶ wind power)? How does the planning process structure relations between ‘lay’ and¶ ‘expert’ roles? How do participants respond to those structures in attempting to influence¶ outcomes?¶ The Construction of Lay and Expert Roles¶ Within the field of science and technology studies (STS) considerable attention has been¶ given to the topic of lay experiences and knowledges. Much of the STS literature has¶ aimed at breaking down the hegemony of scientific knowledge and has highlighted the¶ social factors and uncertainty which play key roles within science. However, it has so¶ far not created a significant change of thinking in the way that the role of lay knowledge¶ is conceptualised in important areas of policy- or decision-making. As such expert knowledge¶ remains central. This is considered a problem since it contradicts the idea of equality¶ ‘presupposed by democratic accountability’ (Turner, 2001, p. 123).

#### The status quo is not democracy. A truly democratic politics must be based upon the identification with The People which cannot speak. The exclusion of voices from the political sphere creates a police order of inequality.

Ranciere 2001 (Jacques, Prof. Phil @ European Graduate School, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Theory and Event 5:3 Muse Online)CJQ

The 'people' that is the subject of democracy -- and thus the principal subject of politics -- is not the collection of members in a community, or the laboring classes of the population. It is the supplementary part, in relation to any counting of parts of the population that makes it possible to identify 'the part of those who have no-part' [le compte des incomptés][7] with the whole of the community. 14. The people (demos) exists only as a rupture of the logic of arche, a rupture of the logic of beginning/ruling [commencement/commandement]. It should not be identified either with the race of those who recognize each other as having the same origin, the same birth, or with a part of a population or even the sum of its parts. 'People' [peuple] refers to the supplement that disconnects the population from itself, by suspending the various logics of legitimate domination. This disjunction is illustrated particularly well in the crucial reforms that give Athenian democracy its proper status; namely, those reforms enacted by Cleisthenes when he rearranged the distribution of the demes [8] over the territory of the city. In constituting each tribe by the addition of three separate boundaries -- one from the city, one from the coast, and one from the countryside -- Cleisthenes broke with the ancient principle that kept the tribes under the rule of local aristocratic chieftainships whose power, legitimated through legendary birth, had as its real content the economic power of the landowners. In short, the 'people' is an artifice set at an angle from the logic that gives the principle of wealth as heir to the principle of birth. It is an abstract supplement in relation to any actual (ac)count of the parts of the population, of their qualifications for part-taking in the community, and of the common shares due to them according to these qualifications. The 'people' is the supplement that inscribes 'the count of the unaccounted-for' or 'the part of those who have no part.' These expressions should not be understood in their more populist sense but rather in a structural sense. It is not the laboring and suffering populace that comes to occupy the terrain of political action and to identify its name with that of the community. What is identified by democracy with the role of the community is an empty, supplementary, part that separates the community from the sum of the parts of the social body. This separation, in turn, grounds politics in the action of supplementary subjects that are a surplus in relation to any (ac) count of the parts of society. The whole question of politics thus lies in the interpretation of this void. The criticisms that sought to discredit democracy brought the 'nothing' which constitutes the political people back to the overflow of the ignorant masses and the greedy populace. The interpretation of democracy posed by Claude Lefort gave the democratic void its structural meaning.[9] But the theory of the structural void can be interpreted in two distinct ways: First, the structural void refers to an-archy, to the absence of an entitlement to rule that constitutes the very nature of the political space; Secondly, the void is caused by the 'dis-incorporation' of the king's two bodies -- the human and divine body.[10] Democracy, according to this latter view, begins with the murder of the king; in other words, with a collapse of the symbolic thereby producing a disincorporated social presence. And this originary link is posed as the equivalent of an original temptation to imaginatively reconstruct the 'glorious body of the people' that is heir to the immortal body of the king and the basis of every totalitarianism. 16. Against these interpretations, let us say that the two-fold body of the people is not a modern consequence of the sacrifice of the sovereign body but rather a given constitutive of politics. It is initially the people, and not the king, that has a double body and this duality is nothing other than the supplement through which politics exists: a supplement to all social (ac)counts and an exception to all logics of domination.

#### The police order of inequality is not benign: It metamorphoses into a retreat from political debate, unleashing a capitalist Leviathan predicated upon inequality.

Ranciere 2001 (Jacques, Prof. Phil @ European Graduate School, “Ten Theses on Politics,” Theory and Event 5:3 Muse Online)CJQ

The 'end of politics' and the 'return of politics' are two complementary ways of canceling out politics in the simple relationship between a state of the social and a state of statist apparatuses. 'Consensus' is the vulgar name given to this cancellation. 32. The essence of politics resides in the modes of dissensual subjectification that reveal the difference of a society to itself. The essence of consensus is not peaceful discussion and reasonable agreement as opposed to conflict or violence. Its essence is the annulment of dissensus as the separation of the sensible from itself, the annulment of surplus subjects, the reduction of the people to the sum of the parts of the social body, and of the political community to the relationship of interests and aspirations of these different parts. Consensus is the reduction of politics to the police. In other words, it is the 'end of politics' and not the accomplishment of its ends but, simply, the return of the 'normal' state of things which is that of politics' non-existence. The 'end of politics' is the ever-present shore of politics [le bord de la politique] that, in turn, is an activity of the moment and always provisional. 'Return of politics' and 'end of politics' are two symmetrical interpretations producing the same effect: to efface the very concept of politics, and the precariousness that is one of its essential elements. In proclaiming the end of usurpations of the social and the return to 'pure' politics, the 'return of politics' thesis simply occludes the fact that the 'social' is in no way a particular sphere of existence but, rather, a disputed object of politics. Therefore, the subsequently proclaimed end of the social is, simply put, the end of political litigation regarding the partition of worlds. The 'return of politics' is thus the affirmation that there is a specific place for politics. Isolated in this manner, this specific space can be nothing other than the place of the state and, in fact, the theorists of the 'return of politics' ultimately affirm that politics is out-dated. They identify it with the practices of state control which have, as their principal principle, the suppression of politics. 33. The sociological thesis of the 'end of politics' symmetrically posits the existence of a state of the social such that politics no longer has a necessary raison-d'être; whether or not it has accomplished its ends by bringing into being precisely this state (i.e., the exoteric American Hegelian-Fukayama-ist version) or whether its forms are no longer adapted to the fluidity and artificiality of present-day economic and social relations (i.e., the esoteric European Heideggerian-Situationist version). The thesis thus amounts to asserting that the logical telos of capitalism makes it so that politics becomes, once again, out dated. And then it concludes with either the mourning of politics before the triumph of an immaterial Leviathan, or its transformation into forms that are broken up, segmented, cybernetic, ludic, etc… -- adapted to those forms of the social that correspond to the highest stage of capitalism. It thus fails to recognize that in actual fact, politics has no reason for being in any state of the social and that the contradiction of the two logics is an unchanging given that defines the contingency and precariousness proper to politics. Via a Marxist detour, the 'end of politics' thesis -- along with the consensualist thesis -- grounds politics in a particular mode of life that identifies the political community with the social body, subsequently identifying political practice with state practice. The debate between the philosophers of the 'return of politics' and the sociologists of the 'end of politics' is thus a straightforward debate regarding the order in which it is appropriate to take the presuppositions of 'political philosophy' so as to interpret the consensualist practice of annihilating politics.

#### Neoliberalism kills value to life and makes extinction inevitable

Santos 2003(Boaventura de Souza Santos, Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra, Collective Suicide?, http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php 2003

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the **end of history**. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed.

### Adv 2 is Political Imaginaries

Adv 2 is Political Imaginaries

#### A democratic ethos of equality makes new political practices possible: Expertism reduces politics to policymaking, which is no politics at all.

Ranciere 2006 (Jacques, Prof. Philosophy @ European Graduate School, “Hatred of Democracy,” Pp. 45-46)CJQ

For, supposing that the titles to govern cannot be contested, the problem is to know what government of the community can be deduced from them. The authority of the eldest over the youngest reigns in families, of course, and one can imagine a government of the city modelled on it. One will qualify it accurately in calling it a gerontocracy. The power of the learned over the ignorant prevails with good reason in schools and one could institute, in its image, a power that would be called a technocracy or an epistemocracy. In such a manner, it is possible to establish a list of governments based on the respective titles to govern. But a single government will be missing from the list, precisely political government. If politics means anything it means something that is added to all these governments of paternity, age, wealth, force and science, which prevail in families, tribes, workshops and schools and put themselves forward as models for the construction of larger and more complex human communities. Something additional must come; a power, as Plato put it, that comes from the heavens. But only two sorts of government have ever come from the heavens: the government of mythical times, i.e., the direct reign of the powerful divine shepherd over the human flock or the daimones that Cronus appointed to the leadership of the tribes; and the government of divine chance, the drawing of lots for governors, that is, democracy. The philosopher strives to eliminate democratic disorder in order to found true politics, but he can only do so on the basis of this disorder itself, which severs the link between the leaders of the city tribes and the daimones serving Cronus. This is exactly the problem. There is a natural order of things according to which assemblies of men are governed by those who possess titles to govern them. In history, we've known two great entitlements to govern: one that is attached to human or divine kinship, that is, the superiority of birth; and another that is attached to the organization of productive and reproductive activities, that is, the power of wealth. Societies are usually governed by a combination of these two powers to which, in varying degrees, force and science lend their support. But if the elders must govern not only the young but the learned and the ignorant as well, if the learned must govern not only the ignorant but also the rich and the poor, if they must compel the obedience of the custodians of power and be understood by the ignorant, something extra is needed, a supplementary title, one common to those who possess all these titles but also to those who do not possess them. Now, the only remaining title is the anarchic title, the title specific to those who have no more title for governing than they have for being governed.

#### You can’t work within the existing framework of policy debate--Police logics make it impossible to see gaps in the logic of inequality. Because inequality is ontologically masked by the police, it becomes impossible to identify without an ASSUMPTION of radical equality.

May 2008 (Todd May, Prof. Phil Clemson University, “The Political Thought of Jacques Ranciere,” Pp. 48-49)CJQ

We have already seen this exclusion at work. In distributive theories of justice, people do not participate in the creation of their political lives. Or, more precisely, their participation, if it happens, is not integral to political justice. As Rawls has told us, when the decision about the principles of justice are made, people “return to their place in society.” They do not, at least as people of the polity, participate in the shaping of the social order. They have no part. It is the elites, those who represent the people, rather than the people themselves, who have a part. This is not all. These theories render this exclusion invisible. By justifying a police order through meeting the criterion of equality, this inequality of participation is effaced. It is as though, once everything has its place, it becomes impossible, or nearly so, to see the inequalities that have been created. This is why Rancière uses the term “sensible.” It is not just that places or roles have been partitioned. The partitioning concerns an entire experience. We experience a whole divided into its proper parts, each allotted its proper place, with no remainder. Foucault emphasizes how people are created and molded to experience the world in ways that are ultimately oppressive to them. Rancière’s idea of a partition of the sensible circulates in the same arena as Foucault’s historical analyses. It concerns the ways in which who we might be, how we might create our own political lives, are hidden from us by our experience of the world. The specific experience he is concerned with, however, is that of politics and the justification of particular police orders. If a police order is characterized by a partition of the sensible that renders invisible the part that has no part, then a democratic politics is, as Rancière tells us, “the manifestation of a distance of the sensible from itself.” A partition of the sensible in the police order covers over the void or supplement that is partly constitutive of it. There is no police order without the participation of the people, those people who are politically invisible, each in her proper place. There is something in the sensible, then, that can, by expressing itself, disrupt the sensible that it partially constitutes. When that something does in fact express itself, it manifests the internal disruption of the sensible, the distance of the sensible from itself. A democratic politics occurs when that manifestation happens. This does not mean that the disruption, the manifestation, is always there. In this sense, Rancière’s thought is distinct from the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida, whose deconstructive structure of the play of presence and absence it resembles at this point. “[P]olitics doesn’t always happen . . . it happens very little or rarely.” But happen it does. And when it does, it does so as a dissensus from the police order, a manifestation of the distance of the sensible from itself. Why is this manifestation not “a confrontation between interests and opinions”? It is because it is an action by the people, the demos, that intervenes upon the situation. The demos has been excluded. A democratic politics is the appearance of that which has been excluded. This is an intervention, not a discussion. “This is precisely why politics cannot be identified with the model of communicative action [i.e. the thought of Habermas] since this model presupposes the partners in communicative exchange to be pre-constituted, and that the discursive forms of exchange imply a speech community whose constraint is always explicable.”17 Democratic politics manifests a people. In a sense we will discuss below, it creates a political subject. It is not a conversation among subjects who have already been established in their character. After all, if one is invisible, what character can one have?

#### Everything is aesthetic, what we give equality methodologically reflects how we articulate politics

Yusoff ’10 Kathryn Yusoff, “Biopolitical Economies and the Political Aesthetics of Climate Change,” Theory Culture Society 27: 73, 2010, Sage

One crucial sphere in the politics of climate change is that of the decisions around what is ‘protected’, ‘saved’ or simply allowed to be in the world, and that which is laid to waste, as an unthought, unrepresented, expenditure of anthropogenic-induced climate change. In the context of nature conservation, Steve Hinchliffe has argued that, in theory, nature conservation is concerned with revealing presence and rendering that presence eternal as an archetypal category. In practice, however, the spaces and times of conservation are less clear, and presence is a precarious form of practice and something that has ‘to be made and re-made’ (Hinchliffe, 2008: 88). This approach of looking into practices does not assume in advance what is and is not political in ecologies, but looks at how politics is conﬁgured through different ﬁgures (or ﬁgurations) of the same species. This re-categorizing of aesthetics as a practice rather than representative of some other socio-political ‘thing’ considers aesthetics in terms of what it does in the world rather than what other experiences or thoughts it might give space or time to. Both approaches (aesthetics as practice, aesthetics as constituting the forms of political representation) offer an idea of aesthetics as a future-oriented practice that is implicitly political but do not conceive of this within the utopian/dystopian mode which strives to offer new images of the world, but, in turn, does not attend to the form through which things become visible (that have previously been invisible) and, crucially, through which we derive new thoughts of the possible. It is the question of visibility that Rancière speciﬁcally takes up to suggest that ‘artistic practices are ways of “doing and making” that intervene in the general distribution of ways of “doing and making”, as well as in the relationslhips they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility’ (2004: 13). What is key here is that: aesthetics refers to a speciﬁc regime for identifying and reﬂecting on the arts: a mode of articulation between ways of doing and making, their corresponding forms of visibility, and possible ways of thinking about their relationships (which presupposes a certain idea of thought’s effectivity). (2004: 10) This attention to modes of articulation between forms, ways of doing and making and their in/visibility offers a politics that ‘revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it’, where what can be seen and experienced is already predetermined by the common forms of aesthetic practice – ‘a parcelling out of the visible and invisible’ (2004: 19). Thus, these ways of ‘making and doing’ are forms of arrangement and distribution in perception that constitute the social and its possible spheres of social action and forms that inscribe a sense of community. So, aesthetics can be thought of as ‘a mode of articulation between forms of action, production, perception and thought’ (2004: 82). In other words, as Ben Higham suggests, in reference to Rancière: ‘aesthetics is the condition of possibility of politics and society’ (2005: 456). Rancière’s model of aesthetics is ontologically social (as aesthetics is about senses), so it does not suggest how the experience and politics of climate change can be made fuller with regards to multispecies living. But if we push this sensibility further to include other encounters with the world that are in excess of the common modes of perception and the social, into the realm of experience that Bataille calls nonknowledge 6 and those practices that do not have humans at their centre, 7 Rancière’s thinking becomes useful in articulating the ways in which aesthetics circumscribes the space of politics (Rancière, 2006). Reconstituting the social with any number of non-human things is one way to let some other things into our consideration of the political aesthetics of climate change; another is to follow Bataille into a more energetic engagement (inspired by Nietzsche’s ‘play of the world’) that searches for the experiences and things that bring us into contact with the depth and complexity of the world (i.e. to think about what constitutes the experience of change that climate shifts instigate; see Bataille, 1988, 1989). But, while we might add to the multiplicity of things, it also becomes increasingly difﬁcult to account for what is taken away in climate-induced biodiversity loss and the mass extinction events that characterize climate change. This difﬁcultly arises because some of what is lost is never so still or so present as to enter a space of representation, and because absences in the ‘play of the world’ are always hidden in the overwhelming presence of things (in both the fullness of representation and experience). Aesthetics, then, can be seen as a form of ethical discourse on the play of things in the world, the politics of which demand that we notice both multiplicity and subtraction.

#### And Prioritizing high-magnitude low-probability impacts vests power in the hands of a hyper-technical capitalist elite incentivized to preserve the status quo; this casts out calls for political equality as “deviant,” to be executed at all costs—guarantees violence.

Swyngedouw 2008 (Erik, Dept. Geography and Development at Manchester, “Where is the political?”) CJQ

Propelled on by a drive towards reflexivity, the need to make decisions on processes with high risk low probability (Beck’s risk society thesis) on the one hand and the injunction to choose in the absence of any grounding or guarantee in truth, transfers administrative powers increasingly to a technocratic-scientific elite who is supposed to know and (cap)able to manage the situation. While difficulties and problems are staged and generally accepted as problematic (such as, for example, climate change, social exclusion, economic competitiveness, and the like), they need to be dealt with through compromise, managerial and technical arrangement, and the production of consensus. Consensus, in a very precise sense, is for Rancière the key condition of post-politics: “Consensus refers to that which is censored … Consensus means that whatever your personal commitments, interests and values may be, you perceive the same things, you give them the same name. But there is no contest on what appears, on what is given in a situation and as a situation. Consensus means that the only point of contest lies on what has to be done as a response to a given situation. Correspondingly, dissensus and disagreement don’t only mean conflict of interests, ideas and so on. They mean that there is a debate on the sensible givens of a situation, a debate on that which you see and feel, on how it can be told and discussed, who is able to name it and argue about it … It is about the visibilities of the places and abilities of the body in those places, about the partition of private and public spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it … Consensus is the dismissal of politics as a polemical configuration of the common world” (Rancière 2003b: §4- 6). Consensus, as the “the annulment of dissensus” announces the “end of politics” (Rancière 2001: §32). This post-political world eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus). However, consensus does not equal peace or absence of fundamental conflict (Rancière 2005a: 8). Indeed, in the absence of real politicization, the only position of real dissent is that of either the traditionalist or the fundamentalist. The only way to deal with them is by sheer violence, by suspending their ‘humanitarian’ and ‘democratic’ rights.

### Solvency

#### Thus Austin and I affirm a removal of restrictions for energy production of wind power in the United States.

Advantage 3 is solvency

#### The plan’s injection of a radical equality into the political sphere breaks down the harmonious functioning of the police order, troubling current ecological ways of thinking.

May 2008 (Todd May, Prof. Phil Clemson University, “The Political Thought of Jacques Ranciere,” Pp. 42-43)CJQ

Policing, as Rancière defines it, is deeply embedded in Western political philosophy. Rancière himself locates the first instance of it in Plato’s Republic. Recall that, for Socrates, people are best fitted for one of three positions in the ideal city, the kallipolis, depending on which part of their soul is dominant. For those who are dominated by their appetitive or acquisitive part, the best role they can play is that of merchants and producers. Those who are dominated by their spirit are the guardians of the city. And those who are dominated by reason, who are able to grasp the nature of the forms, and especially that of the Good itself, are to be the rulers. A harmony in the kallipolis, corresponding to the harmony of the soul, arises when each part fulfills his or her proper role in the city. Disharmony begins when one tries to occupy a position for which one is not suited. As Socrates explains to Glaucon, “when someone, who is by nature a craftsman or some other kind of money-maker, is puffed up by wealth, or by having a majority of votes, or by his own strength, or by some other such thing, at attempts to enter the class of soldiers . . . then I think you’ll agree that these exchanges and this sort of meddling bring the city to ruin.”6 This tripartite division of the city is reflected in the myth – the falsehood, as Socrates acknowledges – of the three metals: gold, silver, and bronze. “ ‘All of you in the city are brothers,’ we’ll say to them in telling our story, ‘but the god who made you mixed some gold into those who are adequately equipped to rule, because they are the most valuable. He put silver in those who are auxiliaries and iron and bronze in the farmers and craftsmen.’ ”7 The story, and the kallipolis it is to support, display both passive equality and inequality, and indeed show the former to be a matter of the latter. For Socrates, a good city is a harmonious one. Everyone is better off in a harmonious city. In order for harmony to reign, however, there are some who must decide how the city is to be ruled, and others who are to be ruled. In this sense, although everyone is equal – in that everyone has a contribution to make to the health of the city – the particular role of some is to be decided by others. The money-makers and the auxiliary guardians are to receive the particular equality that is arranged by the rulers. However, as Socrates makes clear, this is not simply a matter of passive equality. Those whose natures are mixed with gold are “the most valuable.” They are more important for the city than the others. They are not more important in the sense that the city can exist without them; the city requires everyone in order to exist and to flourish. They are more important in that they possess the most valuable skills, the skills associated with understanding harmony and not merely contributing to it. One might ask here what it is that makes that skill, which is only one among others necessary for the harmonious flourishing of the city, more valuable than other skills. It is unclear whether Socrates, or Plato, would have an adequate answer that does not already presuppose the “higher” nature of such a skill. However, at issue here is not the justifiability of this presupposition, but merely its existence. Those who decide the character of the city, while in one sense equal to others in the city, are, we might say, more equal than others. Rancière inaugurates the term “archipolitics” as a description of Plato’s approach to politics. “Archipolitics, whose model is supplied by Plato, reveals in all its radicality the project of a community founded on the integral realization, the integral sensibility of the arkhê of the community, ceaselessly replacing the democratic con - figuration of politics.”8 In archipolitics, everything has its place. Harmony reigns. There is no politics, because there is no assertion of equality. Politics is eliminated because, rather than anyone acting out of the presupposition of equality, everyone is allotted a proper place and is expected to remain there. Policing replaces politics as the project of a political philosophy. In the end, the goal of policing is precisely that of eliminating politics, democratic politics. The existence of democratic politics, we will see, is disruptive of order, particularly of any order that allots people to places or, alternatively, allots places for people to fill. The expression of equality brings disharmony; it is an act of dissensus from a current social order. Therefore, democratic politics is directly opposed to policing. Inversely, the project of policing, which Rancière thinks is the project of much of the history of political philosophy, is that of suppressing or keeping at bay a democratic politics.

#### Discussions surrounding energy production are a unique instance to challenge the aesthetic enframing of the status quo.

Bell et al 5 (Derek Bell, Reader in Environmental Political Theory at the University of Newcastle, Tim Gray, Professor of Geography at Newcastle, and Claire Haggett, professor of sociology at University of Edinburgh. “The ‘Social Gap’ in Wind Farm Siting Decisions: Explanations and Policy Responses” Environmental Politics 14:5 2005 DOI:10.1080/09644010500175833)

Second, information will always be ‘negotiated’ by the public (Bush et al., 2001). Any information provided by developers or ‘independent’ experts will be evaluated and understood in the context of each individual's existing ‘web of beliefs’ (Quine & Ullian, 1970). Each individual's ‘web of beliefs’ will be different (although there may be significant similarities in relatively homogeneous communities) depending upon their education and experience. However, ‘lived experience’, ‘common sense’, ‘local knowledge’ and tacit or ‘practical knowledge’ will all play an important role (alongside ‘technical knowledge’) in how people respond to information provided by proponents of wind energy developments.5 If the perspectives of the particular communities are not understood by policy makers and developers, their ‘information provision’ will be a waste of time (and may even alienate communities). Therefore, direct engagement with communities to encourage them to come forward with their concerns and understandings of the issues would seem to be an essential part of a successful development process.¶ Third, information will always be ‘suspect’ in a climate of mistrust. It is widely recognised that the public do not trust politicians, developers or even experts (Healey, 1996; Breukers & Wolsink, 2003). Therefore, building trust among all of the parties involved in a wind energy siting process seems essential if we want people to take seriously the information that is provided to them (Healey, 1996). In sum, an ‘education’ or ‘information provision’ strategy designed to show qualified supporters of wind energy that their concerns are – in a particular case – unfounded can only succeed if it is grounded in an existing relationship of trust built through a participatory process. If policy makers want to pursue this kind of strategy they need to know more about how trust is built through participatory processes.¶ More knowledge is only one kind of ‘solution’ to the problems posed by qualified support for wind energy. The other alternative is to change ‘the world’ rather than changing people's minds. More specifically, policy makers and wind energy developers could respond by accommodating people's concerns. Pasqualetti (2001, pp.697–8) has argued that wind energy developers have pursued this path since the early days of wind energy:¶ Only 20 years into the modern development of wind power, many of the sources of worry and disapproval have already been addressed successfully. Within that short period, the challenges of turbine size, color, finish, spacing, noise, efficiency, reliability, safety, and decommissioning all have been remedied or conceptually solved by developers, equipment manufacturers, and regulatory authorities.¶ Nonetheless, Pasqualetti (2001) also recognises that important concerns remain, especially about the impact of wind farms on the landscape (see also Wolsink, 2000). In other words, it is the specific choice of location for wind farms and their cumulative effect on particular landscapes that concern qualified supporters of wind energy (Wolsink, 2000). Unlike the mainly technical issues that Pasqualetti (2001) claims have been addressed, there is no ‘technical fix’ for the problem of landscape impact. Instead, the only way of accommodating people's landscape concerns is to site wind farms in places that people find more acceptable.¶ The increasing interest in offshore wind development is an example of this strategy. As former Energy Minister, Brian Wilson, has said, ‘There is ample evidence that the biggest new contributor to our renewables target is going to be offshore wind’ (quoted in McCarthy, 2003, p.7). The interest in offshore wind is clearly motivated by the ‘simpler … local “sociology” of offshore wind power cases’ and the relative lack of interest of ‘Countryside protection organization[s]’ (Marsh & Toke, 2003, p.4; see also CPRE, 2003). However, the siting of offshore wind farms still needs careful consideration to accommodate fishing, shipping, Ministry of Defence, radar, environmental and seascape concerns (Henderson, 2002). Similarly, the siting of onshore wind farms may need to be more carefully planned than at present if landscape concerns are to be accommodated. There are, at least, three different policy ‘levels’ at which this problem might be tackled.¶ First, it might be left – as it often is at present – to developers to work with local communities and other interested parties to find a site that is acceptable. An intelligent developer may recognise that there are good reasons for involving interested parties in the siting process from the beginning to ensure that stakeholders ‘own’ the decision that is made and are less likely to oppose it later. Halliday (1993) describes this as a move from a ‘decide–announce–defend’ approach to one of ‘consult–consider–modify–proceed’. Policy makers and developers need to consider more carefully how developers can successfully engage with local communities.¶ Second, national policy makers might set clear planning guidelines that prohibit or limit development in areas that meet certain requirements. For example, this is the current situation with Areas of Outstanding National Beauty. It makes sense to have national policies that provide clear planning guidance to try to ensure consistency of decision making.6 However, it is also important – if we want to avoid local opposition to developments – to allow enough local flexibility so that communities do not feel that inappropriate national rules are being imposed on them. In other words, national planning policies must be designed to allow for the particularities of place.¶ The third policy ‘level’ that might affect siting choices is energy policy. A number of commentators have argued that UK energy policy has encouraged large-scale wind developments in high-wind areas (often sensitive landscapes) (Hedger, 1995; CPRE, 2003). In particular, the structure of the energy market and the way that renewable energy has been introduced into the energy market (including subsidies, competitive pricing and the National Fossil Fuels Obligation) have been highlighted as factors that have driven development in particular directions.7 If policy makers want to take seriously the possibility of changing ‘the world’ to accommodate the concerns of qualified supporters of wind energy, it may not be enough for them to look to particular developers or to the planning system. They may also need to look much more broadly at energy policy and the energy system.

#### AND Aesthetics come before all other calculations—a presupposition of equality looks to aesthetics regimes which breaks down the logic of domination.

Dikeç 2013 (Prof. Geography at University of London, “Immigrants, Banlieues, and Dangerous Things: Ideology as an Aesthetic Affair” Antipode 45:1)CJQ

Ranciere (2000b) deﬁnes an aesthetic regime as the articulation of three elements: ` modes of production of objects (of what is made available to the senses); their forms of visibility, though a better term here would perhaps be “sensibility” (how they are made available to the senses); and forms of conceptualising and problematising them (how they are talked and thought about), which, in turn, supports the conditions of possibility of the ﬁrst two. An aesthetic regime combines modes of production with “forms of visibility and enunciative possibilities. It is a system of relations between doing, seeing, saying and sensing” (Ranciere 2000b:19). ` Therefore, analyses of aesthetic regimes, thus deﬁned, need to focus on three components: practices (what is made available to the senses); visibility (how is it made available to the senses); and conceptualisation (how is it made to make sense). With this deﬁnition of an aesthetic regime in mind, I argue that ideology may be seen as an aesthetic regime that fulﬁls two conditions: incarnation and deformation, as deﬁned by Laclau. Or, better yet, ideology is an aesthetic regime that makes the dialectics of incarnation/deformation sensible and operational. It consists of the reconﬁguration of a perceptive ﬁeld by putting in place sensible evidences, which has material effects on ways of being, saying, and doing. It is not merely the collection of discourses or systems of ideas; it is the conﬁguration of the “very space”, as Ranciere ` put it, in which certain discourses and ideas are inscribed and articulated, certain objects are given to sensory experience, and made to make sense. This is, in many ways, Foucault with an aesthetic twist But what does Ranciere mean by “very space”? This, I think, is related to his notion ` of the partition of the sensible, a sensible (and governmental) order that depends on certain framings of times and spaces (for example, setting of working times, delimitation of spaces, deﬁning one’s place, etc). What is important here is that this order works through the sensible evidences that are put in place, which constitute a universe of sensible experience. Zi ˇ zek’s remarks are helpful here: ˇ when a racist Englishman says “There are too many Pakistanis on our streets!”, how— from what place—does he “see” this—that is, how is his symbolic space structured so that he can perceive the fact of a Pakistani strolling along a London street as a disturbing surplus? That is to say, here one must bear in mind Lacan’s motto that nothing is lacking in the real: every perception of a lack or a surplus (“not enough of this”, “too much of that”) always involves a symbolic universe (Zi ˇ zek 1994:11).

Prefer inequality first—Violence as inequality occurs in modalities and locales unseen by dominant epistemologies—we outweigh on magnitude and probability. It’s virtually everywhere

Springer ’11 Simon Springer, “Violence sits in places? Cultural practice, neoliberal rationalism, and virulent imaginative geographies,” Political Geography 30 (2011) 90-98, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.01.004

The confounding effects of violence ensure that it is a phenomena shot through with a certain perceptual blindness. In his monumental essay ‘Critique of Violence’,Walter Benjamin (1986) exposed our unremitting tendency to obscure violence in its institutionalized forms, and because of this opacity, our inclination to regard violence exclusively as something we can see through its direct expression. Yet the structural violence resulting from our political and economic systems (Farmer, 2004; Galtung, 1969), and the symbolic violence born of our discourses (Bourdieu 2001; Jiwani, 2006), are something like the dark matter of physics, ‘[they] may be invisible, but [they have] to be taken into account if one is to make sense of what might otherwise seem to be ‘irrational’ explosions of subjective [or direct] violence’ (Zizek, 2008: 2). These seemingly invisible geographies of violence -- including the hidden fist of the market itself -- have both ‘nonillusory effects’ (Springer, 2008) and pathogenic affects in afflicting human bodies that create suffering (Farmer, 2003), which can be seen if one cares to look critically enough. Yet, because of their sheer pervasiveness, systematization, and banality we are all too frequently blinded from seeing that which is perhaps most obvious. This itself marks an epistemological downward spiral, as ‘the economic’ in particular is evermore abstracted and its ‘real world’ implications are increasingly erased from collective consciousness (Hart, 2008). ‘The clearest available example of such epistemic violence’, Gayatri Spivak (1988: 24e25) contends, ‘is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other’, and it is here that the relationship between Orientalism and neoliberalism is revealed.

#### Only a politics based around a fundamental assumption of the equality of each subject can inject affective relations into political action.

Aitken 12 (Mhairi, Research Fellow at U. Edinburgh and PhD from Robert Gordon University. “Changing climate, changing democracy: a¶ cautionary tale, Environmental Politics,” 21:2, 211-229

Overlooking social and political factors within climate science presents an¶ unrealistic picture of how the ‘facts’ have been reached and simultaneously¶ limits the extent to which non-experts can engage with the issue: ‘The discourse¶ on climate politics so far is an expert and elitist discourse in which peoples,¶ societies, citizens, workers, voters and their interests, views and voices are very¶ much neglected’ (Beck 2010, pp. 254–255). This encourages members of the¶ public to take a passive role, to ‘sit back, and want to be told what they must¶ do, rather than go out and learn as well as take their share of responsibility for¶ what could have been presented as a more complex, multidimensional and¶ inherently indeterminate set of human problems, which citizens and their¶ representatives can and should help deﬁne’ (Wynne 2010, p. 300). Where this¶ elitist discourse is challenged and more active engagement with climate change¶ occurs (for example through the climate justice discourse) this receives limited¶ policy attention since it does not ﬁt – and cannot be taken up – within the¶ dominant framing of climate change.